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"PAYMENT" in the business world is usually made by check. Relying on his
drawer's good faith and the criminal prohibition against drawing a "rubber"
check,' the holder customarily presents the check to the drawee bank 2 before
pressing the drawer for payment on the underlying debt. 3 Since the bank, in
the vast majority of cases, makes payment as expected, the holder has come to
believe that in taking a check he receives deposit currency :4 a claim to funds
deposited with the drawee bankY His expectations are akin to those of an as-
signee of a chose-in-action, who becomes the obligee of a debt previously owing
to his assignor. 6
The law, however, does not always coincide with the expectations of busi-
nessmen. In the United States the legal status of a checkholder is analogous
1. Every state has one or more criminal statutes directed against the bad check
fraud. These statutes differ materially in form and substance from state to state. In
general they provide criminal penalties for "making, drawing, uttering or delivering"
a check known to be worthless with intent to defraud. For a compilation of the various
state statutes, see 1 PATOIS, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1146-62 (1940). See also the
model statute recommended for uniform enactment by the American Bankers Association
in id. at 1145.
2. Presentment is usually made directly over the counter or through the mails, or
indirectly through a clearing house by depositing the check with the holder's own bank.
See Note, Deferred Posting Under the Proposed Commercial Code, 59 YALn L.J. 961-3
(1950), and sources cited therein.
3. This practice has been crystallized in the law. See Cruger v. Armstrong and
Barnwall, 3 Johns. Cas. 5 (N.Y., 1802).
4. See SmITH & MooRE, CASES Oi BILLS AND NOTES n.1 (4th ed. 1941); Feezer,
Death of the Drawer of a Check, 14 MINN. L. REv. 124 (1929).
5. The payee is aware, of course, that actual payment will be delayed until the bank
has examined the drawer's account to make sure there are sufficient funds on hand
to cover the check. Barring insufficient funds, however, he regards his claim against
the bank as immediate, subject to no risks during the waiting period. For a detailed
account of the risks he actually runs during the period and the legal rules which have
set limits to the waiting period, see pp. 1020-1 and 1010-20 infra.
6. The early common law did not permit assignment of a chose in action. Assign-
ability was first recognized by the English courts of equity in the fifteenth century. For
a complete survey of the development of assignability of choses in action at law, see
Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action at Law, 29 HA'v. L. Rxv. 818 (1916).
Drawing checks on funds deposited with a bank is analogous factually (though not
legally) to the assignment of a claim in parcels. And while such an assignment is still
not permitted at law on the ground that subjection of a debtor to multiple claims
where only one was originally contemplated would be too oppressive, a debtor may
previously agree to assignment of his debt in parts. McFadden v. Wilson, 96 Ind. 253
(1884); see also 2 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING 1127 n.2 (6th ed. 1928). If the NIL
were amended to permit a check to operate as an assignment, as suggested infra, there
could be no objection on the ground of multiple claims because the agreement between
a bank and its depositor contemplates withdrawal of the deposited funds in parcels.
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to that of a creditor.7 Section 189 of the Negotiable Instruments Law8 provides
that a check of itself, unless accepted by the drawee bank, gives the holder no
claim against the drawer's bank account. And to demolish the theory which
would give the holder such a claim, it specifically provides that a check, in the
absence of parol evidence to the contrary, does not operate as an assignment
of funds on deposit with the drawee bank.9
The check, under American law, is regarded as a mere order to the drawee
bank to pay. Under agency principles the bank's authority may be revoked
before acceptance or payment. 10 And the checkholder's expectation of pay-
ment may be defeated by the drawer's prior insolvency," or by prior garnish-
ment of the drawer's account.12 Although the holder's rights on the underlying
obligation remain unaffected, before payment he runs all the risks of a
creditor.1
3
In France, by contrast, a theory more consonant with business expectations
has been developed under the doctrine of provision.'4 "Payment" by check in
France transfers the provision, or claim of the drawer against the drawee, just
as an assignment would do under American law.' 5 Even without notice to the
7. See Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152 (U.S. 1869); Chapman v.
White, 6 N.Y. 412 (1852).
8. First proposed to the state legislatures in 1896, the Negotiable Instruments Law
is now in force in every state. The last state to adopt the law was Georgia, in 1924.
9. Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law there was a split of authority in the
United States as to whether a check operated as an assignment. The majority position
was that it did not. Bank of Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152 (U.S. 1869) ; Chapman
v. White, 6 N.Y. 412 (1852). But minority jurisdictions, principally in the Midwest
and South, took the opposite view. E.g., Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35 (1860), and cases
collected in Note, 5 A.L.R. 1667 (1920).
Although this conflict was presumably resolved by adoption of Section 189 of the
NIL, the minority rule was hard dying. Some of the old minority jurisdictions still
applied their pre-statutory assignment rule in controversies between the holder of a
check and the drawer or third parties claiming through him, where the bank's interests
were not directly involved. McLain v. Torkelson, 187 Iowa 202, 174 N.W. 42 (1919);
Elgin v. Gross-Kelly & Co., 20 N.M. 450, 150 Pac. 922 (1915); Pease v. Landauer, 63
Wis. 20, 22 N.W. 847 (1885). Today this view has been abandoned on the theory that
Section 189 was intended to establish the majority rule as a uniform one in all juris-
dictions. Leach v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 899, 211 N.W. 506 (1926);
In re Thornton's Guardianship, 243 Wis. 397, 10 N.W.2d 193 (1943). In spite of this
development, however, courts in former minority jurisdictions remained ready to protect
checkholders by finding parol evidence of an intent to create an equitable assignment.
For a discussion of equitable assignments and other doctrines invoked by these courts
for the benefit of holders, see pp. 1020-1 infra.
10. See notes 40, 42, and 64 ilnra.
11. See note 23 infra.
12. See note 36 infra.
13. See Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 370, 248 Pac. 947, 950 (1926).
14. The word has the same root as the English "provision" (Latin, pro+ ±videre, to
foresee). Its meaning is roughly equivalent legally to "deposit."
15. The French Uniform Check Law provides that negotiation of a check transfers
"ownership" in the provision. Law of October 30, 1935, [1935] Dtcanr UN AiNT LE DROIT
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drawee bank this transfer is effective as against the drawer and against those
claiming through him.'6 The drawer relinquishes control over the funds repre-
sented by the check, and circumstances apart from the underlying transaction
cannot affect the holder's right to receive payment from those funds.
Yet the check under the doctrine of provision is something more than an
assignment. It is a negotiable instrument as well. The holder in due course
takes clear of any defenses which could be raised against prior parties. t He
retains a right of action against the drawer and prior indorsers when for any
reason the check is dishonored by the drawee bank.'8 Thus the drawer bears
the risk of the bank's insolvency during the interim between delivery of the
check and timely presentment for payment.' 9
EN MATI.-RE DE CHE.QUEs art. 17, [1935] Dalloz Periodique IV.467 [hereafter cited as
French Uniform Check Law]. And the highest court in France has held that the under-
lying theory of the doctrine of provision is essentially that of assignment of a chose-in-
action. See Boumc-RoN, LA JURISPRUDENCE DU CHkQu 5 (1937). For various other
theories regarding the nature of the interest transferred, see BoUTERoN, LE CHfQUE 138
et seq. (1924). None of these is of practical importance today since almost all the
holder's rights are now specifically described by statute.
16. The best general discussions of the effects of the provision doctrine as applied to
checks are BOUTERO N, LE CHtQuE 324 et seq. (1929); 2 EscARA, MANUEL DE DROIT
ComIERCIAL 746 (1948). See also 4 LYoN-CAEx & RENAULT, TRAITk DE DROIT COMx-
MERCrAL 524-5 (5th ed. 1925) (bankruptcy of drawer); Soci~t6 G~ntrale v. Piednoire,
Cour de Cassation, June 18, 1946, [1946] SimY, RECUEIL DES Lois ET JURISPRUDENCE
[hereafter cited as REcuEn. SInRE] 1.100 (stop order). For the position that in the
case of checks, unlike bills of exchange, the provision doctrine does not protect a holder
against a trustee in bankruptcy or a garnishing creditor of the drawer, see VALfRY, DES
C~rkQIEs EN DRoIr FRAxgAi s 87-90 (1936). Bal~y admits, however, that the French
case law is against him.
For discussions of the provision doctrine as applied to bills of exchange, see HIRscH,
DER REcHTSBEGRIFF PRovISIoN Ia! FRAwz6sIscHEN UND INTERNATIONALEN WECHSEL-
RECHT 50 et seq. (1930) ; Wahl, Die Pranzdsische Wechselprovisionslehlre, 4 ZEITscmUT
FOa AusLXNTiscHEs UND INTERNATIONALs REcHT 405 (1930).
In this Comment the phrase "persons claiming through the drawer" is used to describe
three categories of persons: the drawer's trustee in bankruptcy, (or any other adminis-
trator of an insolvent drawer's estate); a garnishing creditor of the drawer; and the
administrator or executor of a decedent drawer's estate.
Apparently the provision doctrine does not protect the holder of an outstanding check
against the holder of a subsequently drawn but previously cashed check. VALAtRY, supra,
at 92-3. See also BOUTERoN, LE CnkQuE 285 n.3 (1924).
17. French Uniform Check Law, arts. 21, 19; VALLRY, DES CxaQuEs EN DRoIr
FRAN AIS 86, 97. Compare with NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 57.
18. French Uniform Check Law, arts. 19, 40; Cour de Cassation, Nov. 30, 1938,
[1940] RECUEIL SIREY 1.48; see also Pianetti v. Mutuelle du Turf, Dijon, Apr. 14, 1943,
[1944] RECUEIL SMnY 11.60. Compare with NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 57.
19. In the event of the drawee's insolvency prior to payment, the holder may elect
to recover from the drawer the entire amount of the check or to become a claimant in
the insolvent bank's estate. If he chooses the second alternative, he retains a right of
recourse against the drawer for the difference between the face amount of the check
and the amount paid him in the administration of the insolvent's estate. VAL RY, DES
CHkQUES EN Daorr FRA.NAIs 86 (1936). Compare with NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS
LAW § 61.
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The difference between the American and French theories has been de-
scribed as one between a "banking" and a "mercantile" theory.
20 Impetus
in the United States for support of a non-assignment rule has apparently
stemmed from a desire to protect banking interests. Indeed, American courts
justify the non-assignment rule on the ground that it conforms most favorably
with sound banking practice.21 In France, on the other hand, banking inter-
ests play a less dominant role in the community. Development of the doctrine
of provision stemmed from a strong desire to protect the merchant or farmer
who gave value in exchange for a check.
22
The French doctrine has achieved its goal of benefitting merchants and
farmers. At the same time, it appears to have had no ill effect on the French
banking business. The American non-assignment rule, on the other hand,
while of questionable utility as a protector of banking interests, has caused
hardship to checkholders. It has served to defeat checkholders' expectations
in a variety of situations where the bank is a mere bystander.
INCIDENTS OF NON-ASSIGNMENT
Insolvency
One of the most frequent hardships imposed on a checkholder in America
ensues upon insolvency of the drawer. Absent an expression of intent to
create an assignment to the payee, the trustee of a bankrupt drawer is en-
titled to the balance in the drawer's account in preference to the holder of an
outstanding unaccepted check drawn and delivered for value before bank-
ruptcy.23 The holder's only recourse is against the drawer's estate as a general
rather than a preferred creditor. In France, where the check from the time of
its delivery transfers the "ownership" of the provision to the payee, the
drawer's insolvency can have no effect on the holder's right to receive payment
from the provision funds.
2 4
20. See Mitchell, The British Conception of Negotiable Instruntents v. the French,
10 J. Comp,. LEG. & INT'L L. (x.s.) 237, 240 (1928).
21. See Kaesemeyer v. Smith, 22 Idaho 1, 13, 123 Pac. 943 (1912); Imboden v.
Perrie, 81 Tenn. 504, 506 (1884); Attorney General v. Continental Life Insurance Co.,
71 N.Y. 325, 331, 27 Am. Rep. 55 (1877).
It has been suggested, however, that the non-assignment rule was originally applied
to checks not because of practical considerations but because the question first arose when
the assignment of choses in action was not recognized at law. See Feezer, Death of
the Drawer of a Check, 14 MINN. L. REv. 124, 128 (1929).
22. See Mitchell, supra note 20, at 243. The same difference in emphasis explains
the split of authority which existed in the United States prior to the adoption of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. See note 9 supra. In states adopting the minority rule
banking interests played a secondary role. Cf. Note, 46 YALE L.J. 483, 492 (1936).
23. E.g., Bowker v. Haight, 146 Fed. 257 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906). The same applies to
any administrator of an insolvent drawer's estate. Leach v. Mechanics' Savings Bank,
202 Iowa 899, 211 N.W. 506 (1926); People v. Union State Bank of Lancaster, 192
Wis. 28, 211 N.W. 931 (1927).
24. Bou=Rox, LA JuIsPRUDENCE DU CakQuE 181 et seq. (1937); 2 EscARRA,
MANUEL DE DRoIr CoumMRciAL 746 (1948); 4 LYoN-CAEN & RENAULT, TRAITt DE
1010 [Vol. 60 : 1007
ASSIGNMENT BY CHECK
The American result has been justified primarily on the ground that this
is a case where "equality among creditors is equity." The payee and all other
creditors relied on the credit of the drawer; all are equally innocent and should
therefore be given equal treatment. 25 A second possible justification is that
non-assignment is a convenient rule of thumb for striking down transfers to
checlholders which might defraud or discriminate unfairly against the in-
solvent drawer's general creditors.
Neither justification is sound. The first assumes that the checkholder is a
creditor-a status with which he is saddled as a consequence of the non-assign-
ment rule, the very merits of which are in question. Actually, the payee who
takes a check for value is not in truth a creditor. He "collected" his claim in
what commonly passes as cash, i.e., deposit currency,20 and should be pre-
ferred over creditors who elected to trust their debtor instead. Under a broader
view than the equities between the parties, moreover, security in commercial
transactions calls for protection against the drawer's insolvency of a check-
holder who gave full, present value. Such a result has the additional attribute
of encouraging the use and negotiability of checks.
The argument that the non-assignment rule protects the insolvent drawer's
general creditors against fraud or unfair discrimination ignores the existence
of other sources of protection. Where the drawer is in bankruptcy the trustee
may set aside fraudulent conveyances by the drawer perfected less than a
year,27 and preferential payments on antecedent debts perfected less than four
months, before bankruptcy. 28 Where the insolvent drawer is not yet in bank-
ruptcy, fraudulent conveyances made within the period of the state statute of
DRorr CoammcALz 524-5 (5th ed. 1925); WAHL, Pacis DE DRoIT ComXm CL 701
(1922). [For a contrary view, see VALfhaY, DEs CHAQuFs EN DRorT FRANgMs 88-90
(1936).] The French bankruptcy law, however, provides certain exceptions to the general
rule. See CODE BE ComrcE arts. 446-447 (1948). Bouteron, in summarizing the impact
of Articles 446 and 447, states that the delivery of a check is ineffective as against the
trustee in bankruptcy of the drawer if the check is given as a gift or for a debt not yet
due. In both situations the court before which a petition to nullify the transfer is pending
must declare the transfer void as a matter of law. If, on the other hand, the check is
given in payment of a debt due, three conditions must be met before the transfer can be
set aside: (a) the transfer took place after "a cessation des paiements" on the part of
the drawer [the French equivalent of equity insolvency]; (b) the holder knew when he
took the check that payments had been stopped; and (c) the court regards it as desirable
that the transfer should be set aside. BouTERoN, LE DROIT NoUVE u DU CHPQUE 34
(1928). Thus the French law usually permits the holder of an outstanding check to
prevail over the drawer's trustee in bankruptcy, and any exceptions to this rule are
governed by the bankruptcy law, not by the Uniform Check Law.
25. For criticism of this justification of the American rule, see 2 MORSE, BANKS AND
BANKING 1125-6 (6th ed. 1928). Cf. Zane, Death of the Drawer of a Check, 17 HAv.
L. REV. 104, 118 (1903).
26. See note 4 supra.
27. BANKRuPTcY Act § 67d. Under § 70e, moreover, the trustee may set aside any
fraudulent conveyance which a creditor having a provable claim at the time of bankruptcy
could have set aside under state law.
28. BAnKRUPTCY Acr § 60.
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limitations may be set aside under state law by any creditor.29 And although,
with rare exceptions,30 transfers are not voidable as preferences under state
law, preferential transfers constitute acts of bankruptcy if made while the
debtor was insolvent.31 Thus where an insolvent drawer makes a preferential
transfer by check, he can be thrown into bankruptcy and the transfer set aside
by the trustee. Most check transactions, moreover, neither defraud nor dis-
criminate against the drawer's general creditors. Employment of the non-
assignment rule to knock out all outstanding checks is not only superfluous;
it strikes down many transactions which are fair and legitimate under accepted
doctrines of creditor protection. Bankruptcy rules and state law on fraudulent
transfers, rather than the non-assignment doctrine, should govern in the ad-
ministration of insolvent drawers' estates.
3 2
The desirability of establishing a sound check collection system has bred a
recent trend away from non-assignment as applied to the drawer's insolvency
in the area of interbank transfers.3 3 When a checkholder deposits a check for
collection, the depositary bank forwards the item to the drawee. The proceeds
are remitted by the drawee bank to the depositary, usually through one or more
intermediary banks, via an interbank settlement order. Where the settlement
order is in the form of a draft drawn on a third bank, courts protect the payee
of the draft, i.e., the collecting bank, and ultimately the depositing checkholder,
against insolvency of the drawer bank before final payment.3 4 The American
Law Institute, in the Spring 1950 Draft of the proposed Uniform Commercial
Code, followed suit by adopting the assignment theory in this particular in-
29. This may be done under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, adopted by
twenty states since its promulgation in 1919, 9A UIFORM LAws ANN. 45-147 (1951),
or under the Statute of 13 ELIZABETH, c. 5 (1571), adopted by statute or as part of the
common law in all other states. See, e.g., Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500, 28 Pac. 1109
(1892).
30. E.g., 7 MAss. ANN. LAws c. 216 § 110 (1933); WASH. REv. STAT. § 5831-2
(Remington 1932).
31. BAN RU TCY AcT § 3 a(2).
32. For the comparable French solution, see note 24 supra.
33. See Turner, Equitable Assignment of Bank Deposits, 37 YALE L.J. 626, 632-3
(1928).
34. Kesl v. Hanover State Bank, 109 Kan. 776, 204 Pac. 994 (1921) ; Central Trust
Co. v. Bank of Mullens, 108 W.Va. 12, 150 S.E. 137 (1929); Federal Reserve Bank v.
Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S.E. 379 (1924). Contra: Central Farmer's Trust Co. v. Fort
Lauderdale Bank, 114 Fla. 84, 153 So. 93 (1934). For an extensive collection of authori-
ties on both sides of the question, see Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection Iteras, and Trust
Preferences, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 545, 546-52 (1931).
The issue usually arises in a suit brought by A or by Bank X against the receiver of
the insolvent Bank Y (to whom Y's funds in Bank Z have been turned over), seeking
a preference in the distribution of Y's assets. Most courts which allow such a preference
speak of Y bank as holding the funds "in trust" for the depositary bank X, or the
depositing checkholder A. Section 13(2) of the Bank Collection Code does the same.
See, generally, 3 Scotr, TRUSTS §§ 534-6 (1939) ; Bogert, supra; Steffen, The Check
Collection Muddle, 10 TULANE L. REv. 537 (1936); Comment, 36 YALE LJ. 682 (1927).
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stance. This draft provided that an interbank settlement order continued un-
revoked and unimpaired by any suspension of payments by the issuing bank.
35
The inequity of restricting the assignment rule to insolvency of bank issuing
interbank settlement orders is clear from the following illustration: Check-
holders A and B deposit with Bank X checks drawn on Bank Y. A's check is
forwarded to Bank Y, and is honored by an interbank settlement order drawn
by Bank Y on Bank Z. Before final payment by Bank Z, Bank Y fails. A is
protected under the exception to non-assignment by a direct claim against
Bank Y's account in Bank Z or by sharing as a preferred creditor in the assets
of Bank Y.
B's check is forwarded to Bank Y. Bank Y remains solvent, but dishonors
the check because the drawer is insolvent. Under the non-assignment rule,
B has no claim against his drawer's account in Bank Y. He shares in B's estate
as a general creditor.
The fates of A and B, whose equities are the same, are thus made to depend
on which drawer fails. Such inequality can be avoided only by abolishing the
non-assignment rule as applied to a drawer's intervening insolvency.
Garnishment of the Drawer's Account
Similar to the problem raised by the drawer's insolvency is the one presented
by creditors who garnish the drawer's account. Should they be preferred over
the holder of an outstanding check? Again, the answer has been made to
depend on whether or not a check is an assignment. In the United States a,
check, of itself, does not defeat a garnishment levied on the drawer's account
35. A.L.I. UNIFORm CommmcrAtLA CODE § 4-501(3) (Spring 1950 Draft). The com-
ment to this section states that the objective is "to make the remittance draft between
banks effective as if an assignment, or to adopt in part the Civil Law concept of
'provision,' that is, title to the deposit credit passes to the holder of an item when the
item is issued, subject to the interbank settlement order being presented against an
account with a sufficient credit balance."
The Spring 1950 Draft of the Code further provides that if a drawee bank which
has received an item suspends payment before settling for the item or sends an interbank
settlement order which is not collectible, the customer of the depositary bank "may
recover as if a depositor in the payor [drawee] bank" Id. § 4-501(1). Thus if drawee
bank were an insured bank, the holder would be protected by Federal Deposit Insurance
to the extent of $10,000. See note 52 infra; 12 CODE FED. REGS. § 330.2 (Supp. 1950).
Furthermore, under the Code the holder, instead of collecting on the interbank settlement
order or recovering as a general depositor of the drawee bank, can elect to treat the
item as unpaid and hold secondary parties. A.L.I. UNiFORM COmMRcIAL CoDE § 4-501(4)
(Spring 1950 Draft).
For the comparable provision of the Spring 1951 Draft, see A.L.I. UmNFORM Coit-
m--c A CoDE § 4-212 (Spring 1951 Draft). At its May 1951 meeting the American
Law Institute voted to delete as an article from the Code Article 4 (Bank Deposits and
Collections). However, the Institute also voted at that time to retain in Article 3
(Commercial Paper) a number of the sections formerly in article 4. The proposed
final draft No. 2 of the Code is being revised accordingly. Communication to the YALE
LAW JouRNAL from Paul A. Wolkin, Assistant to the Director, American Law Institute,
dated June 18, 1951, in Yale Law Library.
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before payment. 3 Under the French assignment rule the opposite result is
reached.
37
Here, as in the case of the drawer's bankruptcy, the assignment rule better
honors the holder's expectations and fosters the use and negotiability of checks.
In the garnishment situation, moreover, it cannot even be claimed that the
non-assignment rule is a device for fostering equality. On the contrary, it
permits the garnishee to cut off completely the holder who received his check
for value prior to the garnishment. And recourse against the drawer whose
account was garnished will probably prove difficult if not futile.
It may be argued, however, that non-assignment protects the drawer's
creditors against fraudulent or preferential transfers by check immediately
prior to garnishment. But here again other remedies are available. Under
the doctrine of fraudulent conveyances a creditor can set aside any transfer
by his debtor in fraud of his claim.38 And under the Bankruptcy Act he can
throw an insolvent debtor into bankruptcy for making a preferential transfer
and have the trustee set aside the transfer for the benefit of all creditors. 9
Prevention of fraud or unfair preferences can be achieved without adopting
the non-assignment rule--a rule which blankets all checkholders, the legitimate
and the unpreferred as well as the fraudulent and the preferred.
Death of the Drawer
In the United States a bank may not pay a check after receiving notice of
the drawer's death 40 This result is not a necessary corollary of the non-
assignment rule.41 But since a check is not an assignment, it is construed
36. Kaesemeyer v. Smith, 22 Idaho 1, 123 Pac. 943 (1912) ; Wileman v. King, 120
Miss. 392, 82 So. 265 (1919). See also Notes, 50 A.L.R. 403 (1927); 84 A.L.R.
412 (1933).
37. BOUTERON, LE CHf-QUE 324 (1924) ; BOUTERON, LE DROIT NoUVEAU DU CHfQuE
38 et seq. (1928); WAHL, PRacis DE DROIT ComaRcAIL 702 (1922). For a contrary
view, see VALARY, DEs CHiQuEs EN DRoiT FRANCAIS 87-8 (1936).
38. See note 29 supra.
39. See notes 28 and 30 supra.
40. A bank's authority to pay a check is revoked by the death of the drawer; the
administrator of the drawer's estate is entitled to the funds deposited in the drawer's
account at the time of his death. Dixon Shoe Co. v. Moen, 208 Wis. 389, 243 N.W.
327 (1932); Bridewell v. Clay, 185 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). And a bank
paying a check after notice of death is liable to the drawer's estate. Sneider v. Bank
of Italy, 184 Cal. 595, 194 Pac. 1021 (1920). Where the bank pays after death but
before notice, the payment is valid. Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co.,
209 N.Y. 12, 102 N.E. 537 (1913).
A few courts have held, contrary to the general rule, that the drawer's death does
not revoke the bank's authority to pay. May v. Jones, 87 Iowa 188, 54 N.W. 231 (1893).
41. The original draft of the Negotiable Instruments Law contained an additional
section numbered 190, which read as follows: "The death of the drawer does not operate
as a revocation of the authority of the bank to pay a check, if the check is presented for
payment within 10 days from the date thereof." See, e.g., the original draft of the N.I.L
as reported to the New Jersey legislature in January 1896. New Jersey, 52d Senate,
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to create a mere agency ordering the bank to make payment. And since an
agency is usually revoked by the principal's death, the grantor's death is
deemed to revoke the bank's agency under the check.42  In France, by
contrast, the death of the drawer does not affect the checkholder's right to
receive payment.
43
The American rule has been justified by pointing to the holder's right to
recover from the drawer's estate.44 But the drawer may have died insolvent,
and the checkholder may get less than the face amount of the check. And if
the drawer died solvent, the tradesman who-took a check as "payment" for
something of value would be compelled to submit to delay, expense, and in-
convenience as a claimant in the administration of the drawer's estate.
There may be cases, however, where a check has been given to the payee for
nothing. It might be argued that adoption of the French rule in such instances
would thwart the objectives of the Statute of Wills, by permitting a man in his
last illness to sign a check disposing of his entire estate without benefit of
the protective formalities required of a testamentary transfer.4 5 But no less
formality is involved in signing and delivering a check than in writing and
delivering an unsealed instrument of gift-and some courts have held that
delivery of the latter is sufficient to make a valid gift causa vnortis.
40
SENATE JouRNAL 134 at 176 (1896). For a list of the few states which have enacted
statutory provisions similar to the original draft Section 190, see 1 PATON, DIGEST OF
LEGAL OPINION 1085-6 (1940). It is doubtful, however, whether these statutes offer the
checkholder any additional protection, because under them the administrator can probably
recover any payment made after the drawer's death. Burrows v. Burrows, 240 Mass.
485, 134 N.E. 271 (1922) (held that a Massachusetts statute permitting the bank to pay
a check within ten days of its customer's death, with or without notice, was enacted for
the bank's protection and had no bearing on the rights of the holder against the drawer's
estate).
1 MoRsE, BANKS AND BANKING 891 (6th ed. 1928) contends that revocation of the
bank's authority by the drawer's death is a "perversion of reason." And Balkam, Payment
of a Bill of Exchange by the Drawee After the Drawer's Death, 14 HAv. L. REv. 588,
589 (1901), contends that death of the drawer is not a revocation of the bank's authority
to pay, since a countermand of the original order cannot be made without an act of will
on the part of the drawer.
42. See Miller v. Medford National Bank, 115 Ore. 366, 370-1, 237 P. 361 (1925);
In re Ludlam's Estate, 158 Misc. 283, 285 N.Y.S. 597, 601 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
43. French Uniform Check Law, art. 33; 2 ESCARRA, MANUEL DE DROIT COMMR aCIAL
746 (1948); VALtRy, DES CHtQuEs EN DRorr FRAxcArS 84-5, 93-4 (1936).
44. See Zane, Death of the Drawer of a Check, 17 HARv. L. REv. 104, 118 (1903).
45. Cf. Re Hughes, [1888] 59 L.T. (o.s.) 586 (C.A.); Mechem, The Requirement of
Delivery it Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instru-
nents, 21 ILL. L. REv. 568, 574 (1927). Indeed, the rule that the drawer's death revokes
the'bank's agency originated in a gift check case. Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jr. 111, 118
(1793); see Feezer, Death of a Drawer of a Check, 14 MINN. L. REv. 124, 128 (1929).
46. Goldsworthy v. Johnson, 45 Nev. 355, 204 Pac. 505 (1922) (liberty bonds in
possession of bank) ; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178 (1875) (promissory
notes). For cases upholding the validity of a gift causa nortlis by the delivery of a sealed
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Furthermore, if there is any special reason for holding a gift-check revocable
by the drawer's death, it could be accomplished under an assignment theory by
specific legislation without prejudicing the interests of the lolder of a check
drawn for value.47
The new Uniform Commercial Code remedies in part the inequities of
revocation by death. It codifies the present rule that the drawer's death does
not revoke the drawee's authority to pay until the drawee has knowledge of
the death. But it further provides that even with such knowledge a bank may
pay checks for ten days after the date of death unless directed to stop payment
by some person claiming an interest in the account. 48 The shortcoming of
this provision lies in its failure to protect the holder against countermands by
parties in interest. Where the drawer dies insolvent his creditors will surely
stop payment to bring the proceeds within the drawer's estate.
Laches and Intervening Insolvency by the Drawee Bank
Barring laches for failure to make timely presentment to the drawee or to
give proper notice of dishonor to the drawer and prior indorsers, a check-
holder in France has alternate remedies upon improper dishonor against the
bank and against the drawer and prior indorsers. 9 In America the holder's
only recourse upon dishonor is against the drawer and prior indorsers.50
In both countries, a holder guilty of laches loses his recourse against prior
indorsers.51 In neither country is the drawer, at least in theory, discharged
instrument, see Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591 (1852); Meyers v. Meyers, 99 N.J.Eq. 560,
134 Atl. 95 (1926). Many courts, however, hold that a gift causa mortis cannot be
effected by delivery of an instrument of gift, whether sealed or unsealed. E.g., McGrath v.
Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566 (1875); Knight v. Tripp, 121 Cal. 674, 54 Pac. 267 (1898).
See, generally, Mechem, supra note 45, at 573-6, 582-3; 4 CoRBiN, CoxRAcrs § 921 (1951).
See also Note, 63 A.L.R. 537, 552-8 (1929).
47. Paton suggests that there may be valid grounds for distinguishing between gift
checks and those drawn for value, although he admits that courts do not seem to have
drawn this distinction. See 1 PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OP NIos 1080 (1940).
In contrast with the rule as to checks, the death of the drawer of a bill of exchange
does not resolve the drawee's authority to pay. See Feezer, supra note 45, at 138. But
bills are less likely to be drawn gratuitously than checks.
48. A. L. I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-505 (Spring 1951 Draft).
49. French Uniform Check Law, arts. 17, 40.
50. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 61, 66.
51. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw §§ 70, 71; French Uniform Check Law, art. 40.
But see Article 52 of the French Uniform Check Law, which provides that a holder
guilty of laches has a claim against prior parties other than the drawer to the extent of
their unjust enrichment. For discussion of Articles 40 and 52, see VALPRY, DES CHkQUES
EN Dgorr FRANgAIS 439-40 (1936). As to the holder's rights against the drawer, see
note 53 infra.
For an extensive comparative study of the rights of a holder guilty of laches against
the various obligees on the instrument, see Kessler, Levi, & Ferguson, Some Aspects of
Paymennt by Negotiable Instrument: A Comparative Study, 45 YALE L.J. 1373 (1936).
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absolutely. In the United States he is discharged on the check and underlying
obligation to the extent that he is damaged by the drawee's intervening insol-
vency.52 In France, the holder has an action against the drawer if there
never was a provision or if the account has been withdrawn.5"
Recourse against the drawer on the American pro tanto theory must wait
until the bank's insolvency proceedings have been wound up and the drawer
paid off: the amount of loss resulting from the holder's failure to withdraw the
funds before insolvency cannot be determined until then. 4 In France, where
the holder retains a direct claim against the bank, he can participate in the
insolvency proceedings as a general creditor against what is left in the
depositor's account. 55 Circuity of action is avoided and the holder is sure of
recovering the full amount of the check less whatever was lost through his own
negligence. In the United States the holder, with no claim against the bank,
must proceed against the drawer for pro tanto recovery. Not only is he
delayed thereby, but because of the difficulty of assessing damages, he may be
52. Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that "[a] check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." The
rule has often been stated as if the only injury chargeable to the holder is that which
would result from the drawee's insolvency. See Andrus v. Bradley, 102 Fed. 54, 55-6
(C.C.E.D.Pa. 1900); Flemming v. Denny, 2 Phila. 111, 112 (D. Ct. Phila. 1856). There
is, however, authority to the contrary. See Notes, 53 L.R.A. 432 (1902); 38 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 255 (1912). Furthermore, while Section 186 refers only to failure to make
presentment, in practice it has also been applied to failure to give notice of dishonor.
Deal v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 225 Ala. 533, 144 So. 81 (1932). And an injured
debtor-drawer is discharged pro tanto not only on the instrument but also on the under-
lying obligation. Kessler, Levi, & Ferguson, Some Aspects of Payment by Negotiable
Instrument: A Comparative Study, 45 YALE L.J. 1373, 1387 (1936).
The likelihood of damage to the drawer as a result of the intervening insolvency of
the drawee bank is lessened by Federal Deposit Insurance, which now protects a depositor
of an insured bank to the extent of $10,000. Pub. L. No. 797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2
(Sept. 21, 1950).
53. French Uniform Check Law art. 52; 2 EscAaRA, MANUEL DE Daoir COmmERciAL
753 (1948) ; VALtRY, DES CQtuEs EN DRoIT FRAlNAIs 439-40 (1936).
54. See Comment, 8 N.C.L. REv. 444, 449 (1930).
55. VALik.RY, DES CHkQuEs EN DRoIT FRANCAIs 86 (1936). Article 40 of th8 French
Uniform Check Law discharges all obligees on a check upon an undue delay in present-
ment. This discharge, however, does not operate in favor of the drawee bank, because
of the provision doctrine. Instead, Article 32, providing that the drawee may pay a
check even after the expiration of the statutory period prescribed for presentment, has
been read as mandatory and not merely permissive. A bank with adequate provision must
pay an overdue check unless the statutory period of limitations has run. Socit6 Genrale
v. Piednoire, Commerce Tribunal de Bordeaux, March 2, 1944 [1945] REcum, SmEy
II. 12.
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denied recovery completely.5 6 The net effect may be enrichment of the drawer
at the expensd of the checkholder.yt
The Uniform Commercial Code, in this particular instance, reaches a result
which would ensue under an assignment theory. Under the Code, when the
drawee fails after the holder has been guilty of laches, the drawer is discharged
only if he makes a written assignment to the amount of the check of his claim
against the drawee.15 Although the fiction of non-assignment is preserved by
the Code, the choice for the drawer is hardly voluntary. 9 In effect, an assign-
ment accrues to the benefit of the checkholder despite the absence of any
showing that the parties so intended.
Blanket adoption of an assignment rule would not place on the checkholder
the risk of the bank's insolvency before timely presentment can be made.60 It
might be argued that under traditional assignment law the checkholder would
bear the risk of the bank's insolvency where his drawer had no reason to know
of it at the time he delivered the check.61 Here again, however, the French
experience is helpful. In France, the check retains all the characteristics of
a negotiable instrument, one of which is that the drawer bears the risk of the
56. See, e.g., Commercial Investment Co. v. Lundgren-Wittensten Co., 173 Minn. 83,
216 N.W. 531 (1927) ; Kling Bros. v. Whipps, 132 Okla. 253, 270 Pac. 79 (1928). See
also Kessler, Levi, & Ferguson, supra note 51, at 1387: "In any event it is almost correct
to say, for practical purposes, that total discharge follows any injury to the drawer of
a check." Compare A.L.I. UNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Spring 1950 Draft), comment to
§ 3-502: "The decisions have turned upon burden of proof, and the drawer has seldom
succeeded in proving his discharge."
57. Out-of-court assignments of the drawer's rights against the bank, however, have
sometimes protected the holder. See Gregg v. George, 16 Kan. 546 (1876). But such
assignments are not mandatory. And in states where the holder has the burden of showing
the absence of injury, the drawer has little reason for making an out-of-court assignment.
See Kessler, Levi, & Ferguson, supra note 51 at 1387-8.
"In the application of the so-called pro tanto rule, considerable difference has arisen
as to the burden of proof. The majority rule seems to be that the drawer will have the
burden of showing that he has been injured. [Citing cases] . . . In some of the states
applying the majority rule, the burden is satisfied if the drawer shows that the drawee
bank is insolvent, and it remains for the holder to show that there is no causal relation
between his laches and the damage caused by the insolvency. [Citing cases.]" Id. at
1388 n. 63.
58. A.L.I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-502(1) (b). (Spring 1951 Draft).
59. In this respect the approach of the English Bills of Exchange Act is more
realistic. A drawer who is damaged by an unreasonable delay in presentment is dis-
charged to the full amount of the check, but the holder gains an assignment of the
drawer's claim against the bank by operation of law without any act on the part of the
drawer. 45 & 46 Vicr. c.61 § 74 (1882). See CHALmERs, BILLs OF EXCHANGE 295 (9th
ed. 1927).
60. This risk has been reduced considerably today. Federal Deposit Insurance,
which now protects the drawer to the extent of $10,000 against the bank's insolvency
before payment or acceptance, see note 52 supra, should under an assignment rule
protect the holder of an outstanding check.
61. See 4 CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 904 (1951).
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bank's insolvency between delivery of the check and timely presentment. 6Z A
similar result can be reached in America even under an assignment rule. Sec-
tion 61 of the Negotiable Instruments Law protects the timely payee against
the bank's insolvency by giving him recourse against the drawer. Though the
check be turned into an assignment, retention of Section 61 would qualify the
assignment and save the check one of its essential earmarks of negotiability.
Stopping Payment
In the United States, the drawer's right to stop payment is well established.03
A check is not an assignment, but simply an order to the bank to pay funds
to the holder. As such it creates an agency relationship between the drawer
and the bank, revocable by the drawer at will.6465 This rule, by permitting the
drawer to stop a check when he has been defrauded on the underlying trans-
action, has probably been instrumental in preventing many frauds. But the
rule goes much farther and permits a drawer to stop payment capriciously.
And while the holder of a stopped check has recourse against the drawer,08
during the delay necessary to enforce his claim he runs all the risks of a
general creditor.67
The French Uniform Check Law goes to the other extreme. Strictly inter-
preted, it limits the drawer's right to stop payment to two situations: loss of
62. See note 19 supra.
63. The right to countermand is provided for only indirectly by Section 114 of the
NFGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, which specifies that notice of dishonor need not be
given to the drawer who has countermanded payment. But the practice has long been
sanctioned by judicial decision. Florence Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U.S. 385 (1888);
Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782 (1920) ; Steiner v. German-
town Trust Co., 104 Pa. Super. 38, 158 Atl. 180 (1931). Cases are collected in 5A
MicHIE, BANKS AND BANKING § 193 (1950); 1 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING §§ 398-9
(6th ed. 1928). See, generally, Moore, Sussman & Brand, Legal and Institutional
Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment of Checks, 42 YALE LJ. 817 (1933);
Zollman, Stopping Checks, 15 MARQ. L. REv. 197 (1931).
Any act of the drawer which conveys to the drawee bank before payment or certifica-
tion definite instructions to stop payment and identifies the check properly, is sufficient.
No prescribed language is required, and the direction may be given by telegram, in
writing, by telephone, or other verbal means. Zollman, supra at 199.
64-65. See 1 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING §§ 397-9 (6th ed. 1928).
66. The drawer cannot avoid genuine liability to the holder after stopping payment.
If the drawer has no defenses, he remains liable both on the check and on the under-
lying transaction. See Schirm v. Wieman, 103 Md. 541 (1906); Brown v. Cow Creek
Sheep Co., 21 Wyo. 1, 126 Pac. 886 (1912).
67. See Usher v. Tucker, 217 Mass. 441, 443, 105 N.E. 360, 361 (1914): "[H]ence
the effect [of stopping payment] so far as respects the drawer is to change his condi-
tional liability to one free from the condition, and -his situation is like that of the maker
of a promissory note."
1951] 1019
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the check and insolvency of the holder.68 The statute does not give the drawer
the right to stop payment on the ground of fraud or failure of consideration. 9
A better solution than either the American or the French would protect the
holder from the consequences of an improper countermand, and at the
same time allow the drawer to raise fraud or failure of consideration. Even
under an assignment rule the drawer should be allowed to assert any valid
defense on the underlying transaction against anyone but a holder in due course
by notifying the bank to stop payment. The bank would then be obliged to
segregate the funds available to meet the check until the parties could be
interpleaded or until the holder sues the drawer in a separate action to litigate
the drawer's defense.70
PROTECTION OF CHECKHOLDERS: EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT
American courts have not been oblivious to the inequities of the non-assign-
ment rule. Though governed by Section 189 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, they have seized upon the doctrine of equitable assignment to honor the
checkholder's expectation where a so-called "assignment-in-fact" could be
found.
Section 189 establishes only a presumption that a check is not an assignment,
rebuttable by extrinsic evidence of the drawer's intent to assign his account
or any part of it to the payee.71 In Fourth Street Bank v. Yardley 72 the
Supreme Court protected a payee against his drawer's insolvency where the
payee had advanced money to the drawer bank to enable it to meet its clearing
house obligations on the assurance that the drawer had enough on deposit with
68. French Uniform Check Law, art. 32. Penal sanctions attach against a drawer
who in bad faith withdraws funds necessary to meet a check or raises an invalid defense
to payment. Id., art. 66, as amended by Law of May 24, 1938, [1938] Dalloz Priodique
IV. 257. See also 2 EscARA, MANUEL DE DRorr CommERciA. 747 (1948).
69. It has been suggested, however, that the defenses of failure of consideration,
fraud, and illegal consideration may be raised before payment against a payee or holder
with notice by virtue of statutory provisions outside the Uniform Check Law. See
VALRY, DEs CHf-QUEs EN DROIT FRANCAIS 145 et seq. (1937); 4 LYoN-CAEN &
RENMLT, TRATr DaE DROIT Co-ME=RcIAL 527-8 (5th ed. 1925). For a contrary view,
see LAcouR, Paicis DE DRorr COmmERCrAL 370-1 (8th ed. 1945). The difference of
opinion among French authorities is summarized in BouTERoN, LE Cw QUE 285 et seq.
(1924). Bouteron states that on this point the case law is as divided as the treatise
writers.
70. For other methods of protection of the bank, see text at note 94 infra.
71. Originally, there was some doubt whether extrinsic evidence of an assignment-in-
fact could be introctuced to modify the non-assignment rule. See Holbrook v. Payne, 151
Mass. 383, 385, 24 N.E. 210 (1890). The language of Section 189 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, however, that a check "of itself" does not operate as an assignment,
indicates that parol evidence is admissible to rebut the presumption. Dunlap v. Com-
mercial Nat. Bank of L.A., 50 Cal. App. 476, 195 Pac. 688 (1921); Leary v. Citizens' &
Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 123 Conn. 475, 23 A.2d 863 (1942).
72. 165 U.S. 634 (1897).
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its New York correspondent to cover the check. In finding an equitable assign-
ment the Court declared that the intent to create it need not be expressed in
formal terms: it may be inferred from language used in and outside the
instrument and circumstances surrounding the underlying transaction.
In line with the Yardley case, 73 courts have adopted the doctrine of equitable
assignment to protect payees against the drawer's garnishing creditors, 74 the
drawer's death 5 or insolvency,76 and unwarranted stop orders.77 In doing
so they have earmarked special situations calling for a conclusive presumption
of intent to create an assignment. Where a check is drawn for the exact
amount in the drawer's account, 78 or where a special deposit is made to pay
a particular check,79 for example, the finding of equitable assignment is almost
a certainty.80
73. The force of Yardley was weakened somewhat by Equitable Trust Company of
New York v. First National Bank of Trinidad, 275 U.S. 359 (1927). See Turner,
Equitable Assignment of Bank Deposits, 37 YALE L.J. 626, 630-2 (1927). The doctrine
of equitable assignment has nonetheless gained a strong foothold in the states. See notes
74-80 infra.
74. Carlson v. Stafford, 166 Minn. 481, 208 N.W. 413 (1926); Slaughter v. First
National Bank of Lamesa, 18 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Hatley v. West Texas
National Bank, 284 S.W. 540 (Tex. Com. App. 1926). See also McClain & Norvet v.
Torkelson, 187 Iowa 202, 174 N.W. 42 (1919) ; but see Leach v. Mechanics Savings Bank,
202 Iowa 899, 211 N.W. 506 (1926).
75. Dunlap v. Commercial Nat. Bk. of L.A., 50 Cal. App. 476, 195 Pac. 688 (1920);
Aubrey v. O'Byrne, 188 Ill. App. 601 (1914); Webb v. O'Geary, 145 Va. 356, 133 S.E.
568 (1926).
76. Early & Daniel Co. v. Pearson, 36 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1929) ; Houck v. Bank of
Newport, 150 Ore., 295, 43 P.2d 179 (1935); Austin v. Public National Bank, 2 S.W.
2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullens, 108 W.Va. 12,
150 S.E. 137 (1929).
77. Kilgore National Bank v. Moore Bros. Lumber Co., 74 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934) ; Green v. Brown, 22 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
78. McEwen v. Sterling State Bank, 222 Mo. App. 660, 5 S.A.2d 702 (1928) ; In re
Eshenbaugh's Estate, 114 Pa. Super. 341, 174 Atl. 809 (1934). The same result has been
reached even in the case of a gift check. Varley v. Sims, 100 Minn. 331, 111 N.W.
269 (1907).
79. Manget v. National City Bank of Rome, 168 Ga. 876, 149 S.E. 213 (1929);
Boyle v. Vivian State Bank, 55 S.D. 441, 226 N.W. 579 (1929).
80. Even when invoked by a court, equitable assignment is no infallible method of
protecting the checkholder. For example, the bank may refuse to pay on the ground of
an alleged set-off arising out of a prior transaction between it and the drawer. See
Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 483, 487-8 (1937). In that event, a finding of equitable assign-
ment would probably not help the holder, since the obligor of an assigned claim who has
a set-off against the assignor can assert it 'against the assignee even if it arose out of
a collateral transaction, at least where the set-off existed as a matured claim at the time
of the assignment. 4 CoRBNi, CoNTRAcrs § 897 (1951).
In an effort to protect the checkholder in this and other situations, courts have invoked
at least two theories in addition to equitable assignment:
(1) § 137 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. This section provides that where a
drawer to whom a bill of exchange is delivered for acceptance destroys it or refuses to
return it, he will be deemed to have accepted the bill. The applicability of this section
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CONCLUSION
The operation of an assignment rule effected by amendment of Section 189
can best be illustrated by five typical situations. On June 1, the drawer A
buys goods from B and in return gives B a check drawn on bank C. Before B
presents the check or in any way notifies C that the check is outstanding, one
of the following things happens:
1. A withdraws all his funds from bank C.
2. A goes bankrupt. His trustee in bankruptcy immediately withdraws
A's funds from bank C.
3. A dies. The executor of his estate immediately draws all A's funds
from bank C.
4. A creditor of A garnishes A's funds in bank C, then obtains a judg-
ment against A and collects all A's funds from bank C to satisfy the judg-
ment.
5. A draws a second check on bank C payable to D. D cashes this check
at bank C. After payment of the check, there are insufficient funds remain-
ing in A's account to pay B.
After one of these things has happened, B presents his check to bank C and
demands payment.
In each of these situations, the bank is protected. Since it had no notice
of A's outstanding check to B, it could with impunity, even under an assign-
ment rule, pay out A's funds to A himself, to those claiming through A
to checks was tested in the early case of Wisner v. First National Bank, 220 Pa. 21,
68 Atl. 955 (1908). The drawee bank had failed to return within twenty-four hours after
receipt several checks received by mail from a collecting bank. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held, first, that Section 137 applies to checks presented for payment, and, second,
that mere retention constitutes a "refusal to return" within the meaning of that section.
The drawee bank was therefore deemed to have accepted the checks. The Wisner rule
has since been adopted in a number of states. See 1 PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIO S
14-17 (1940) ; BRANNAN, NEGorIABLE INSTRUIUMNTs LAw 137 (Beutel ed. 1948) ; BrTroN,
BILLS AND NoTS 831 n.2 (1943) ; Notes, 63 A.L.R. 1138, 1140 (1929), 68 A.L.R. 862
(1930). Cf. Penn. Laws 1909, Act 169, overruling Wisner in the state of its birth.
(2) Third party beneficiary. Particularly in the midwest, in order to protect farmers
and cattlemen, courts have given check-holders an action against the bank as third party
beneficiaries of the contract between the bank and its dealer depositors. Goeken v. Bank,
100 Kan. 177, 163 Pac. 636 (1917); Ballard v. Home National Bank, 91 Kan. 91, 136
Pac. 935 (1913); See Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 483, 484 (1937). Except in limited cir-
cumstances, no set-off is available against a third party beneficiary. REsTATEuENT,
CoNTRACTS § 140 (1932).
For a legislative approach to the same desire to protect stockholders, see Model
Deferred Posting Statute, treated in detail in Note, 59 YALE L.J. 961 (1950). The statute
was drafted by the American Bankers Association, with the cooperation of Federal
Reserve lawyers, and circulated for adoption by the states. Id. at 964, n. 14.
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(situations 2, 3 and 4 above), or to D.81 B may not be remediless, however;
here the assignment rule would make a difference. In situation 2, for example,
B, as an assignee, would be entitled to priority to the extent of the amount
of his check on the funds withdrawn by A's trustee from bank C.8 2 Unless a
preference or a fraudulent conveyance could be shown, B could collect from
the trustee the full amount of the check in a reclamation proceeding on the
theory that the trustee held the funds collected from bank C in constructive
trust for B as assignee.s 3 And under the 1950 amendment to Section 60a of
the Bankruptcy Act, no preference could be shown merely because the assign-
ment might not be good in some states against subsequent assignees. 
4
Similar results would be reached in situations 1, 3 and 4. Without an
assignment rule, possession of the check puts B in no better a position than
other creditors. 85  Under an assignment rule, B would have a prior claim
against the funds withdrawn from bank C, at least insofar as they could be
traced.86 In each of the respective situations, A, his executor, or his creditor
would hold the funds for the benefit of B, subject to the defenses against him
arising from the original transaction.
In situation 5, on the other hand, different results would be reached depend-
ing on the jurisdiction. Under the so-called New York rule, for exampl.,
B could collect back from D, who would hold the funds as a subsequent
assignee subject to B's prioi rights.8 7 The lack of notice would be irrelevant.
In jurisdictions following the English rule, on the contrary, notice would be
81. See 4 CoRniN, op. cit supra note 80, § 894.
82. Id., § 903. The trustee in ba, kruptcy would of course stand in no better a
position than any subsequent attackir g creditor. Cf. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank v.
Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), where the trustee prevailed over the assignee by showing
a preference. See 4 CoRnix, supra, § 903 n.74.
83. It would probably be necessary to trace the funds in some fashion. See Cunning-
ham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924); 6 COLLmER, BANIMUPTCY 1202-4 (14th Ed. 1950).
84. In the Klauder case, supra note 82, a preference was found because the assign-
ment had not been perfected against the hypothetical subsequent assignee set up in the
then § 60a of the Chandler Act, 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1946). For dis-
cussion, see Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article and Section 60, 16 L. &
CoNTEmp. PRoB. 76, 79-81 (1951). The 1950 amendment, which requires perfection
against any "subsequent lien . . . obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings" rather
than against a bona fide purchaser, was specifically designed to overrule Klander. 64
STAT. 22 (1950), 11 U.S.C.A. § 96 (Supp. 1950). See MacLachlan, Preference Redefined,
63 HAav. L. REv. 1390 (1950). The notice-filing and validation statutes adopted in
several states for the same purpose are directed at accounts receivable assignments, and
presumably -would not apply to assignment by check. See, e.g., Omo GEN. CODE ANN.
§§ 8509-3 to 8509-6 (Supp. 1949) (notice-filing); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 6718-26 (1949)
(validation); Countryman mpra, at 81, n.28-32.
85. See text at note 7 mupra, et seq.
86. See note 83 supra.
87. Cf. Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N.Y. 277, 41 N.E. 572 (1895) ; Superior Brassiere Co.
v. Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 208 N.Y. Supp. 944 (1st Dep't 1925). For discussion
of the New York, Massachusetts, and English rules, see Countryman, supra note 84, at 79.
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essential to B's claim, and payment to D would be final.88 Similarly, D would
be protected in Massachusetts (four-horsemen) rule states, since B would not
have fulfilled any of the four elements of the rule-payment, novation, judg-
ment on the assignment, or possession of essential documentary evidence of
it.8 9 In order to make payment final in New York rule states,90 if an assign-
ment rule were adopted, Section 189 should be additionally amended to adopt
the payment part of the Massachusetts rule and protect the first checkholder
to collect from the bank.
The principal objection by banks to the working of an assignment rule of
this type would be to the possibility of notice. It was assumed in the situations
outlined above that the bank had no notice of the outstanding check. The
bank was therefore protected in paying any of the persons hypothesized. But
B may attempt to avoid the inconvenience of being forced to go against the
person paid by the bank. He may seek to prevent the bank from paying out
the funds by notifying it of his outstanding check--either by telephone or by
mail. If the bank, with notice of the outstanding check, paid out A's funds
to A, to a person claiming through A, or to D, it would still, under normal
assignment law, be liable to B.91
In order to avoid the burden this would place on them, banks could simply
contract with their depositors to incur no liability on any check assignment
until notified of it through presentment. As an assignee, any holder of a check
would be bound by the terms of the contract between the debtor bank and the
drawer-assignor. 92 The bank would then be in as safe a position as under
the non-assignment rule. It would have opportunity to check the drawer's
balance before incurring liability on a check. And if it ascertained upon pre-
sentment that a stop order was in effect on a particular check, it would be
88. See Dearie v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ch. 1828).
89. This rule was adopted by RESTATEmExT, CONTRACTS § 173 (1932). The last
requirement-documentary evidence or "tangible token"--apparently refers to a unique
document, such as a bank book or a bond certificate, not simply a written assignment of
the sort a check would be.
90. See generally Note, Deferred Posting under the Proposed Commercial Code, 59
YALE L. J. 961 (1950).
91. See 4 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 80, § 894.
92. Any debtor may specify that his debt is not assignable at all. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MIZNT, CONTRACTS § 151 (1932); 4 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 80, § 873. The lesser
step of limiting the conditions on which the debt may be assigned follows from this
power to prohibit all assignments.
This solution would incidentally also take care of the troublesome case where a
payee gets a nonconforming acceptance from a bank (see N.I.L. §§ 132, 134, 135 and
187 for the requirements of a binding acceptance), and then sues the bank for the face
amount of the check after the drawer has withdrawn all his funds. The bank is now
immune under the non-assignment rule. E.g., Rambo v. First State Bank of Argentina,
88 Kan. 257, 128 Pac. 182 (1912). It would still be immune under an assignment rule
so long as the drawer withdrew the funds before the payee presented the check. The
rule would operate much as the proposed rule for competing checkholders, discussed
at notes 87-90 supra.
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able to take immediate action to protect itself. Even though technically liable
to the holder, it could avoid fighting the drawer's battles " either by inter-
pleader, or by giving notice to the drawer so as to estop him from later con-
testing the right of the bank to pay out on any judgment in favor of the
holder. 14 Alternatively, as suggested above, it could escape litigation com-
pletely by contracting with the depositor for segregation of funds sufficient
to cover the amount affected by the stop order.9 5
An assignment rule would thus operate more equitably than the non-
assignment rule presently does, and do so without impairing the commercial
utility of payment by check. Protection of banking practices and a more
realistic equation of legal effect to business expectation could go hand in hand.
93. See, e.g. Zane, Death of the Drawer of a Check, 17 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1904).
94. See Minneapolis Nat. Bank v. Holyoke Nat. Bank, 182 Mass. 130, 65 N.E. 24
(1902). Cf. Konitzky v. Meyer, 49 N.Y. 571 (1872). One authority has advocated
avoiding all stop order problems by abolishing stop orders completely. 3 PAToN, DIGEST
or LGAI OPINiONs 3469 (1940).
95. See text at note 70 supra.
